Ma`rifat-e Eghtesad-e Islami, Volume 5, Issue 1, No 9, Year 2025 , Pages 5-56

    The Hidden Costs of Reward and Punishment Policies in Economics

    Article Type: 
    Research
    Writers:
    Parviz Dawoodi / Professorof Shahid Beheshti University / p_davoodi@yahoo.com
    ✍️ Mohammad javad Tavakkoli / Assistant Professor of IKI / tavakoli@qabas.net
    Pages: 5-56 Receive Date: 2025/04/08 Accept Date: 2025/04/08
    Abstract: 
    The results of some experimental studies show that the fiscal reward-and- punishment policy can have a negative effect on people's economic activities in some realms, such as working conditions, voluntary activities and environment protection. This effect is known as hidden costs of Incentive and unusual valuable effect. This paper seeks to analyze the economic explanation of this phenomena and investigates its theoretical and Policy-making means. The findings of this research show that most of the investigations made concerning this phenomena point to the functions of reward in reducing intrinsic motives and consider that the solution of the problem lies in choosing between doing without the incentives and using a strong material incentive. This paper observes that incentives can reduce the degree of effect on behavior rather than weaken the inner motivations in benevolence. The political prerequisite of this theory is the simultaneous use of economic and noneconomic incentives in the area of common interest activities. This approach is compatible with the Islamic approaches to separation between spiritual and material motivations and also their simultaneous stimulation in Islamic speech and precepts by emphasizing on spiritual motivations.
    Keywords: 
    price theory
    price effect
    Non-Standard price effect
    Hidden Costs of Incentivesclassification.
    چکیده و کلیدواژه فارسی (Persian)
    Title :هزینه‌های مخفی سیاست‌های تشویقی و تنبیهی در اقتصاد
    Abstract: 
    نتایج مجموعه ای از مطالعات تجربی نشان می دهد که سیاست های تشویقی و تنبیهی مالی می تواند اثر منفی بر عملکرد اقتصادی افراد در حوزه هایی همچون محیط کار، فعالیت های داوطلبانه و حفظ محیط زیست برجای بگذارد. از این اثر با عنوان «هزینه های مخفی مشوق ها» و «اثر قیمتی نامتعارف، یاد شده است. این مقاله به تجزیه و تحلیل و تبیین های اقتصادی این پدیده و بررسی لوازم نظری و سیاستی آن می پردازد. یافته های تحقیق نشان می دهد که بیشتر تبیین های ارائه شده از این پدیده به کارکرد مشوق ها در زمینه‌ی کاهش انگیزه های درونی اشاره دارد و راه حل گریز از مشکل را انتخاب بین عدم استفاده از مشوق و یا استفاده از مشوق مادی قوی دانسته است. مقاله‌ی حاضر این فرضیه را مطرح می کند که مشوق ها می توانند به جای تضعیف انگیزه های درونی خیرخواهانه، از میزان اثرگذاری آن بر رفتار بکاهند. لازمه‌ی سیاستی این نظریه استفاده‌ی همزمان از مشوق های اقتصادی و غیر اقتصادی در حوزه‌ی فعالیت های عام المنفعه است. این رویکرد با رهیافت های اسلامی در تفکیک بین انگیزه های مادی و معنوی و همچنین تحریک همزمان آن ها در خطابات و احکام اسلامی با تأکید بر انگیزه های معنوی سازگار است.
    Keywords: 
    اقتصاد اسلامی
    مشوق
    نظریه قیمت
    هزینه مخفی تشویق و تنبیه
    سایت‌های تشویقی تنبیهی
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    APA | MLA | HARVARD | VANCOUVER

    Dawoodi, Parviz, Tavakkoli, Mohammad javad.(2025) The Hidden Costs of Reward and Punishment Policies in Economics. Ma`rifat-e Eghtesad-e Islami, 5(1), 5-56

    APA | MLA | HARVARD | VANCOUVER

    Parviz Dawoodi; Mohammad javad Tavakkoli."The Hidden Costs of Reward and Punishment Policies in Economics". Ma`rifat-e Eghtesad-e Islami, 5, 1, 2025, 5-56

    APA | MLA | HARVARD | VANCOUVER

    Dawoodi, P, Tavakkoli, M.(2025) 'The Hidden Costs of Reward and Punishment Policies in Economics', Ma`rifat-e Eghtesad-e Islami, 5(1), pp. 5-56

    APA | MLA | HARVARD | VANCOUVER

    Dawoodi, P, Tavakkoli, M. The Hidden Costs of Reward and Punishment Policies in Economics. Ma`rifat-e Eghtesad-e Islami, 2025; 5(1): 5-56