Ma`rifat Eqtesadi

Although Islamic banking emphasizes participatory contracts, their actual share in Iran’s banking system remains limited. One major obstacle to their development is default risk arising from moral hazard under asymmetric information, where banks, as capital providers, face operational risks due to lack of transparency in agents’ behavior. This study aims to assess the feasibility of managing default risk caused by moral hazard in participatory contracts, with a focus on the moderating role of Web 3.0 technology. The research employed a mixed-method approach with a sequential exploratory design. In the qualitative phase, the Delphi method was applied to identify components of moral hazard, resulting in three key factors. In the quantitative phase, partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was used to test conceptual relationships. Data were collected through a structured questionnaire from 289 banking and fintech experts. Findings show that Web 3.0, through tools such as smart contracts, distributed ledgers, and data-driven monitoring, effectively mitigates risks associated with moral hazard and exerts a significant moderating effect on the relationship between moral hazard and default risk. Moreover, information asymmetry strongly influences the emergence of moral hazard and the diversion of resources from contractual objectives. Overall, the study offers a practical framework for default risk management and the adoption of modern technologies in Iran’s Islamic banking.