Ma`rifat Eqtesadi

The experience of high inflation rates in the Iranian economy has transformed the issue of compensating for the loss of money value in deferred payments into a fundamental question. Some contemporary jurists (*fuqaha*) do not classify such compensation as an "excess" (*ziyadah*) or *riba* (usury/interest), and have deemed it permissible to receive. This *fatwa* (legal ruling) is supported by various arguments, including the "principle of *la darar*" (no harm), the assertion that the term "excess" does not apply, the argument that an obligation is not truly fulfilled if the loss of value is not compensated, the intrinsic link between the nature of fiat money and purchasing power, and certain religious traditions (*riwayat*). Nevertheless, there has been little rigorous discussion regarding the specific criterion for determining the amount to be compensated; reliance has primarily been placed on the inflation rate, while some jurists have suggested using the price of a benchmark commodity as the standard. In this paper, employing a method of jurisprudential analysis, the two criteria—the "inflation rate" and the "price of a benchmark commodity"—are examined and critiqued from both jurisprudential and economic perspectives. Assuming the principle of compensation is accepted, it is proposed that the lower of the two rates—the inflation rate or the rate of wage increases—should serve as the basis for calculating the compensation for the loss of money value in deferred payments. This is because any amount received in excess of the principal debt falls under the scope of the prohibitions against *riba*, unless it can be definitively excluded from that scope. In cases of doubt, one must rely on the "certain minimum" (*qadr-e mutayaqyan*), which, in this context, corresponds to the lower of the two rates. Of course, the fundamental solution lies in addressing the root causes of inflation, rather than merely compensating for its negative effects.