Ma`rifat Eqtesadi

The expansion of government intervention in the economy and the deployment of monetary and fiscal policies have consistently raised the question of the legitimate boundaries of such interventions. Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), emphasizing the monetary sovereignty of the state, identifies inflation as the primary constraint on fiscal policy, whereas the fiqh maxim of lā ḍarar (the no-harm principle) restricts any harmful public action. The present study aims to elucidate the limits of legitimacy for monetary and fiscal policies based on Modern Monetary Theory and the no-harm principle. The research is applied in purpose and employs an exploratory-descriptive method for data collection. The statistical population comprises economic and jurisprudential elites and experts, from whom 23 individuals (6 fiqh experts and 17 economic specialists) were selected through purposive and convenience sampling. The required data were gathered and analyzed using the Delphi technique with the participation of experts in monetary economics, Islamic economics, and economic fiqh. The findings indicate that the legitimacy of policies involving money creation and budget deficits depends not only on economic efficiency but also on the extent of their impact on public welfare and the avoidance of harm, particularly through inflation and the erosion of purchasing power. Accordingly, the maxim of lā ḍarar can provide a normative framework for evaluating and delineating the limits of government economic intervention. In line with the legitimacy of monetary and fiscal policies within the framework of Modern Monetary Theory and the no-harm principle, this study presents a final model consisting of 5 factors and 26 indicators. Moreover, the results suggest that the legitimacy of government monetary and fiscal policies requires the consideration of five fundamental and influential factors: (1) economic legitimacy, (2) inflation control, (3) distributive justice, (4) avoidance of public harm, and (5) desirable economic governance.